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He Ao Pohewa: The PHARMAC Prescription for Pharmacoeconomic Analysis in New Zealand 
and the Standards of Normal Science 
Paul C Langley   




In common with a number of other single payer health systems, New Zealand has, through the Pharmaceutical Management Agency 
(PHARMAC), established guidelines for formulary submissions by pharmaceutical manufacturers. A question that is important to 
health system decision makers is to whether or not guidelines for economic evaluations in countries like New Zealand are consistent 
with the standards of normal science. Do the guidelines require those making the submission to put their claims in the form of 
testable hypotheses that can support falsification and replication? Are post-listing evaluations of these claims ever carried out? The 
purpose of this review is to consider whether the 2012 PHARMAC guidelines meet these standards. The assessment argues that the 
guidelines do not meet the standards of normal science. Instead, from this perspective, they are best characterized as supporting the 
creation of he ao pohewa (an imaginary world). There is no requirement in the guidelines for claims to be expressed as testable 
propositions; as hypotheses for expected impact that can be evaluated and the outcomes reported as part of ongoing disease area 
and therapeutic class reviews. There is no commitment to the discovery of new facts though falsification and replication. Our review 
concludes with suggestions for a reworking of the guidelines to meet the standards of normal science.  
 




Guidelines for the submission of clinical and cost-
effectiveness claims to support formulary listing and pricing, 
the Prescription for Pharmacoeconomic Analysis (PFPA)  were 
first introduced in New Zealand by the Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency (PHARMAC) in 1999. They were 
subsequently reviewed in 2007 and updated with minor 
changes in 2012 (version 2.1) 1. PHARMAC’s  statutory 
objective is: ’to secure for eligible people in need of 
pharmaceuticals, the best health outcomes that are 
reasonably achievable from pharmaceutical treatment and 
from within the funding provided (under Section 47(a) of the 
New Zealand Public Health and Disabilities Act 2000). The 
purpose of the PFPA guidelines document is to provide an 
overview of the methods PHARMAC uses when preparing 
submissions including a required cost-utility analysis. As 
stated in the PFPA guidelines ‘Documenting of this 
methodology aims to ensure that cost-utility analyses 
performed by (and for) PHARMAC measure costs, benefits, 
time preference and uncertainty in a similar fashion; hence 
enabling comparison between the cost-effectiveness of 
different interventions and ensuring that the results of 
analyses are meaningful for decision making’. PHARMAC’s  
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objective is to ensure, with funding provided, ‘the best 
possible health outcomes’ for the target New Zealand 
population. This is to be achieved by maximizing the total 
health gains possible.  
 
The purpose of this assessment is to consider whether or not 
the PFPA guideline methodology can support the objective of 
maximizing health gains.  The key question is whether or not 
the PFPA methodology is consistent with the standards of 
normal science? Do the PFPA guideless support hypothesis 
testing, falsification and replication? If not, is their advocacy 
of models or simulated claims an acceptable alternative and a 
valid input to formulary and pricing decisions? Or should the 
PFPA guideless be seen as supporting the creation of he ao 
pohewa (false or imaginary worlds) to justify investment 
decisions 2 3. Are the guidelines to be considered as science 
or pseudoscience? 4 
 
Standards of Normal Science 
The standards of normal science, as they have been accepted 
since the 17th century in the natural sciences and, at least in 
economics in the social sciences, is that the discovery of new 
facts can only proceed through a process of falsification and 
replication 5. In the case of formulary decision making where 
a committee has to judge the relative merits of competing 
products or a new product versus the standard of care, the 
applicable criteria are the evaluation of competing testable 
claims for clinical impact, cost-effectiveness and budget 
impact in target treating populations. If this objective is to be 
achieved, claims submitted by manufacturers (and internal 
assessments carried out by, in this case, PHARMAC staff) 
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should be in a testable form. While there is no necessary 
requirement that an assessment be carried out prior to an 
initial formulary and pricing decision, there should be the 
prospect that such an assessment can be carried out and 
reported back to decision makers in a meaningful time frame. 
In practical terms this might be expressed in terms of an 
assessment protocol to accompany a submission with a 
feedback within two years. 
 
The requirement for hypothesis testing is both obvious and 
inviolate. Claims for cost-effectiveness should not be taken at 
face value. Judging a theory by the ‘reasonableness’ of its 
assumptions has long been rejected.  Popper in his seminal 
contributions to the philosophy of science, points to the fact 
that claims must be capable of falsification; indeed they should 
be framed in such a way that makes falsification likely 6. 
Commitment to falsification forces us to reconsider our 
models and the assumptions built into those models.  
 
At the same time there is the need for replication. This has 
been brought home in the last few years by attempts to 
replicate clinical trial and laboratory claims. There has been 
increasing concern expressed over the presence of repetitive 
flaws and the need for guidelines to improve experimental 
reproducibility. As noted in a recent editorial in Nature 
applicants to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are now 
required ‘to explain the scientific premise behind their 
proposals and defend the quality of their experimental 
design’ 7. More recently, Camerer et al in their evaluation of 
laboratory experiments in economics find, of the 18 studies 
considered, an effect size in the same direction in only 11 
replications with on average a replicated effect size of 66% of 
the original 8. As the authors note: the deepest trust in 
scientific knowledge comes from the ‘ability to replicate 
empirical findings’ although rarely carried out in the social 
sciences.  
 
The Pharmacy PFPA Guidelines 
Under the PFPA guidelines the recommended technique to 
support investment decisions in pharmaceuticals when a 
significant funding proposal is involved is cost-utility analysis. 
Otherwise, an internal evaluation occurs. This has to take 
account of a pragmatic public policy/purchasing environment 
with constrained analytical capacity. There is, for PHARMAC, 
an inevitable trade-off between precision and timeliness of 
cost-utility analyses (leading to a threefold classification of 
preliminary, indicative and detailed cost-utility analyses). The 
PFPA guidelines apply to all classifications. 
 
The cost-utility assessment is from the perspective of the 
funder (PHARMAC) with regard to the PHARMAC decision 
criteria. If there are anticipated appreciable impacts on non-
healthcare sectors these should be assessed qualitatively. The 
target population, and possible sub-groups are those most 
likely to receive treatment. Sub-groups should be identified if 
there are anticipated significant differences in treatment 
effect. Comparators for the analysis should be the funded 
treatment that most prescribers or clinician’s would replace. 
Alternatively, it could be the treatment given to the largest 
number of patients if this differs from the treatment most 
prescribers would replace.  If treatment regimens differ 
substantially through New Zealand, then a range of 
comparators should be identified. 
 
The preferred relative treatment effect claims are from 
randomized clinical trials (RCTs) and meta-analyses. Grades of 
evidence should be assigned with an assessment of external 
and internal validity. The methodology, limitations and any 
possible bias from extrapolating from clinical trials in the 
long-term (and generalizing results to a New Zealand setting) 
should be described clearly. 
 
Models or simulations should be transparent and avoid 
undue complexity. In the case of discrete period events such 
as acute interventions without recurrence, a simple decision 
tree is recommended. Where the model is tracking the 
natural cause of a disease Markov models are recommended. 
In the majority of models, a lifetime horizon capturing all 
major clinical and economic outcomes, is required. If 
possible, adherence should be included in the modeled claim.  
The health benefits from interventions should be measured 
using QALYs. Options to QALYs are disability adjusted life 
years (DALYs) and healthy year equivalents (HYEs). The 
PHARMAC support for QALYs is that they are simple to 
calculate, have face validity and enable a cost-utility analysis 
to be performed. The recommended instrument for 
describing health states is the New Zealand EQ-5D Tariff 2 9. 
Where appropriate, costs should be estimated for (i) 
community and hospital pharmaceuticals; (ii) diagnostic 
related groups (DRGs) for inpatients; (iii) outpatients (e.g., 
healthcare professional costs); and (iv) direct patient health 
care (e.g. general practitioner visits). Costs incurred by 
patients living longer as well as indirect costs should not be 
included. The benefits and costs included in a simulation 
should be discounted at a rate of 3.5% (with rates of 0% and 
5% in sensitivity analyses). 
 
The results of the modeled or simulated cost-utility analysis 
should be reported as incremental utility cost ratios (IUCRs); 
the inverse of cost-per-QALY. These are interpreted as the 
opportunity cost of investment decisions under a fixed 
budget and are expressed as QALYs per $1 million invested. 
The IUCR should be presented as a point estimate as well as 
the plausible range over which QALYS per cost are expected 
to vary. To capture parameter uncertainty, univariate and 
multivariate sensitivity analysis together with probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis may be necessary. If there is a concern 
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with structural uncertainty, repeated analysis using 
alternative structures should be employed.   
 
The Contribution of Simulations 
The PFPA case for recommending cost-utility analysis in 
submissions is that it is practical, enables comparisons and 
supports the prioritizing of pharmaceuticals to support 
investment decisions. The PFPA document explicitly rejects 
cost-effectiveness thresholds. The PFPA case is that given the 
range of criteria that contribute to a formulary decision and 
the requirement that spending on pharmaceuticals is kept 
within a fixed budget, thresholds are inappropriate. As 
budgets may vary from year-to-year, there is no threshold 
below which a pharmaceutical is considered cost-effective.  
 
With a commitment to lifetime (or at least long-term) cost-
utility models to support interventions in non-recurrent or 
acute disease states, claims made for product impact are 
immune to failure. There is no way in which these claims can 
be evaluated empirically. At the same time, the proposed 
measures for reporting the results of the cost-utility 
simulation are, to all intents and purposes, also immune to 
failure. There is no possibility, unless interventions are 
reported for short-term, acute intervention decision models, 
that any of the claims made could ever be tracked and 
reviewed. The requirement for discounted QALYs, costs and 
savings makes the process of evaluation that more difficult.  
 
If the standards of normal science are the benchmark, then 
PHARMAC’s decision framework is clearly at variance. The 
required analysis fails the standards for hypothesis testing, 
falsification and replication. The focus on the lifetime 
modeling of disease states and the recommendation for 
QALYs as the preferred measure of health status effectively 
ensure that any post-market entry reassessment of the 
claimed benefits and costs of an intervention is impossible. In 
practical terms, therefore, it is impossible for PHARMAC to 
claim that, for a given budget period, their pharmaceutical 
investment decisions are consistent with securing ‘the best 
health outcomes’ with the funding provided. It is impossible 
for PHARMAC to look back over the past 15 years and review 
the long-term (or at least mid-term) impact of previous 
investment decisions against claims made (and accepted) for 
costs and benefits.  
 
If we put the standards of normal science to one side, is it 
possible to justify the PHARMAC acceptance of modeled and 
simulated cost-utility claims as a meaningful approach to 
investment decisions? One possible argument could be that 
New Zealand, a small country with limited resources, is not in 
a position to set up standards that are at variance with those 
currently in place in other single payer developed economies 
such as Australia, Canada, Ireland and the UK 10 11 12 13 . In the 
UK, for example, the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) has a staff of over 550 and an annual 
budget of over £60 million 14. In the case of submissions to 
NICE, where the reference case is central to the process of 
review, the application of thresholds is best seen as a basis 
for price negotiations 15 . This is understandable given that 
the reference case cost-per-QALY claims are either untestable 
or immune to falsification. Indeed, it seems clear that it was 
never intended that claims could be evaluated. Matching 
imaginary claims to an arbitrary threshold of £20,000 or (in 
designated cases) £30,000 per QALY by modifying either the 
imaginary simulation itself or the unit price of the product is 
well accepted.  
 
Arguing for a second best methodology is not consistent with 
the emphasis placed by PHARMAC on models and 
simulations. There is no recognition that their methodology 
may be considered second best. Rather, the case made is that 
cost-utility models or simulations are the ‘global’ standard in 
health care decisions. PHARMACs position is that by imposing 
a common methodology, analyses are undertaken in a similar 
fashion, enabling comparisons across different interventions. 
They are supported in this by practice standards issued by 
professional groups such as the International Society for 
Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) 16 17.  
 
The claim for a ‘global’ standard raises the possibility that, 
unwittingly or not, PHARMAC in common with agencies in 
other single payer systems and the US has adopted a 
relativist position 18 19 20. Rather than subscribing to the 
position that the standards of normal science are the only 
standards to apply in health care decisions, the relativist 
position is that all perspectives are equally valid. In their 
advocacy of the equivalence or symmetry principle health 
care decisions are to be understood sociologically. No one 
body of evidence is superior to another. The success of a 
scientific research program rests not on its ability to generate 
new knowledge but on its ability to mobilize the support of 
this community. Decisions are based on the constructed 
evidence of models and simulations.  Evidence is never 
discovered. Instead of coming to grips with reality this 
‘science’ is about rhetoric, persuasion and authority. Truth is 
consensus. 
 
A major objection to the relativist position is that competing 
evidence can be constructed and simulations can generate 
opposing claims. If the simulated input conditions and the 
simulated core mechanism correspond to ‘reality’, the 
sufficient condition character of the simulation assures us 
that the output is necessarily entailed. 21. But simulations can 
be challenged; simulations can fail. Competing simulations 
can support alternative input conditions, core mechanisms 
and output predictions. Simulations can be ‘reverse 
engineered’ to generate competing claims yet still remain 
within ‘agreed’ guidelines. Any attempt to argue for the 
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superiority of one simulation over another in its 
correspondence to ‘reality’, in the absence of a commitment 
to a comparative experimental assessment of claims 
generated, simply lacks credibility.  
 
These conclusions hold irrespective of how much we attempt 
to build up the appearance of being scientifically rigorous in 
the validation of models and simulations 22. We can claim 
that they ‘adequately reflect reality’, we can apply 
deterministic and probabilistic sensitivity analyses, we can 
produce ICER cloud diagrams, we can apply thresholds and 
we can even introduce an analysis of the value of perfect 
information. Nevertheless, the fundamental objection still 
applies: there are no testable predictions and, as such, 
simulations for health care decisions fail the standards of 
normal science. It seems pointless to argue that the 
standards set by PHARMAC are acceptable because there is a 
community consensus, shared by NICE and other single payer 
systems together with the ‘community of 
pharmacoeconomists’, that models or simulations are 
acceptable as ‘projections’, even though the projected claims 
are patently untestable and, in all too many cases, we never 
intended to be testable. This misses the point entirely: claims 
for the comparative effectiveness of competing 
pharmaceutical products should meet the standards for 
evaluation, falsification and replication. Otherwise they are 
simply pseudoscience; they do not meet the standards of 
normal science, they share the platform with intelligent 
design rather than natural selection. To repeat the point 
made earlier: we have no idea if the claims are right or if they 
are wrong. To argue for a relativist position that truth is 
consensus is to put to one side the potential for discovering 
new facts and the role of evidence in clinical decision making.  
 
The PHARMAC commitment to constructed evidence, to the 
advocacy of imaginary worlds, stands in contrast to recently 
introduced guidelines for formulary evaluation released by 
the College of Pharmacy, University of Minnesota 23. These 
guideless reject untestable modeled or simulated claims, 
emphasizing the importance of testable claims, 
experimentation and replication. A key feature is the 
requirement for a claims assessment protocol to accompany 
formulary submissions. Manufacturers are asked to 
underwrite value claims assessment in a timeframe relevant 
to formulary decisions. 
 
Conclusions 
In the absence of a requirement for testable claims to 
accompany submissions for formulary listing and pricing, 
PHARMAC is in no position to argue that these submissions 
contribute materially to the objective of achieving, within 
budget constraints, the best health outcomes for target 
populations in New Zealand. Unless claims for outcomes 
expressed in cost-utility terms can be evaluated in a 
timeframe that is meaningful for decision makers, PHARMAC 
has to recognize that the claims presented are immune to 
failure. Unfortunately, QALYs are not reported on a regular 
basis as part of administrative health records or electronic 
medical records in health care systems that advocate cost-
per-QALY claims. 
  
A commitment to improving patient outcomes, and the 
increasing focus on the information needs and potential 
benefits of precision medicine, underscore the role of 
feedback for clinical and cost-effectiveness claims. Relying on 
simulated cost-utility models with a lifetime horizon to 
support investment decisions in pharmaceuticals is 
unacceptable. Rather than following the consensus 
‘pharmacoeconomic’ view in modeling for health care 
decisions, PHARMAC should consider stepping back and 
focusing on the components of product claims that are 
evaluable in the short term. This does not exclude utility 
measures as a potential outcome or short term ICUR claims. 
The key point is that a commitment to short term evaluable 
claims commits PHARMAC to supporting the standards of 
normal science and a commitment to evidence based 
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